



Ni en tu lengua, ni en la mía: A Manifesto on Experimental Writing

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This is a manifesto claiming for the need of experimental writing as a powerful tool to help overcome three of the biggest problems of psychology: its obsession with representation, its complicity with colonialism and its neglect of the body. These three problems, I argue, can be fought by breaking apart the writing technologies we use to produce knowledge in psychology and moving toward experimental writing. Experimental writing thus is important for theoretical, political and ontological reasons that I will elaborate. While I explain these three problems, and as a performative exercise of my argument, a tryptic poem will be interwoven and simultaneously written. The name of the poem is Beheaded Monsters. While this Abstract has reflected on content, I conclude with a 'Concrete' that reflects on form.

KEYWORDS

experimental writing, psychology, beheaded monsters, decoloniality

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Ni en tu lengua, ni en la mía is a manifesto for a very much needed and long overdue disruption with writing technologies within psychology, and towards the adoption of what I refer to as experimental writing. This gesture is manifested through three arguments here: First, that Psychology's problems with representation are shaped by the writing technologies promoted within the discipline. Second, that academic writing technologies give away that there are and there have always been deep, co-constitutive trajectories between psychology and colonization where the former works to accomplish the agenda of the latter. And third, that practices around writing, reading and talking like an academic psychologist promote habits that push bodies into certain affective registers. While I elaborate these three arguments I will elaborate something else too. A poem.

1 | FLESHLESS WRITING

The history of writing is the history of humanity. I mean this in the worst possible sense, to say that the history of writing gives away the permanent power-tantrum of western civilization. Writing technologies emerged from the beginning as political devices for the preservation of the "truth" of those in power to write such truth, and to reproduce and disseminate such writings. In Covid-19 times those with access to technology are more enabled toward some version of the "new normality" than those with limited technological resources, making the technological divide clearer than ever; this is nothing but the latest expression of the monopolization of the means of language. Writing. Reading. Talking, by those in privilege. Writing technologies carry the double game of allowing to tell while setting excluding norms for the telling. Writing is, and it always has been a hierarchical system fully embedded within the structures and relations of power that we live under, and therefore it is devoted to reproducing such structures and relationships as they are.

The association of writing with knowledge production has been crucial for the legitimation of written knowledge in detriment of unwritten knowledge. But even more, written production of knowledge has never meant that all writing systems are equally legitimized, knowledge that had not been written following the western logic of writing has systematically been delegitimized, to say the least, either in terms of the language or just by not complying with the western academic writing standards. One of the most problematic aspects of writing in psychology continues to be the extent to which, as a colonial mechanism, psychology continues to make sure that the legitimacy of knowledge equates with the language of the empire. This means, if your psychology is going to be taken seriously it must be written in English. Although the coloniality of english is far from being the only problem that psychology has on writing. It is rather a condition of possibility for a deeper problem. Let's see...

By the beginning of the 20th century, the logic of writing for psychology was first marked by the ghosts of scientism and the pretention of objectivity. What we know as experimental psychology adopted forms of language such as the "writing in third person". The use of the "passive voice". Avoiding personal opinions or judgments of value which by the way is ridiculous. The "systems of citation". The lack of swearing and all forms of slang, colloquialism and other ways in which we actually use language. Fucking ridiculous! The very grammatic, syntactic, morphologic rules that regulate the academic system of representation. Writing. Reading. Talking. And all kind of efforts to show detachment from the content of the writing, including the imposture of writing with correct or proper English and/or any other european language used to produce academic knowledge. Psychology has systematized all these efforts to write by using language in a way that is different from our everyday use of language to create psychology's academic voice. To write in a language that is not ours. Another tongue. Their tongue. All this writing technology emerged as a tool for legitimation, to help them claim that the knowledge produced was beyond their mortal human minds, and most importantly beyond (and therefore superior) to any association with gut feelings, personal experiences, physical

emotions, etc. In short, psychology's writing technologies are an effort to produce fleshless writing. By fleshless writing I mean a kind of writing that firstly, excludes to a lower hierarchy those who can't communicate using that language or using that language in that way. Fleshless writing keeps psychology away from other people's flesh. And secondly, fleshless writing keeps the flesh of the writer away from their own words in presumption of a higher voice. Fleshless writing keeps psychology detached from their authors, which is simultaneously constitutive of both, a voice of authority and a separated form of existence which is empowered to use such voice: the white experts write with fleshless words. Detachment then becomes the grammatics of academic writing in psychology.

These kind of fleshless writing technologies were not random, they were natural consequences of the epistemological and ontological commitments through which psychology has tried to legitimate itself as a science. Psychology needed to believe in the idea of an objective world that can be observable, measurable, controlled, and therefore where all its components and relations could be accurately described through language. Out of that need to believe, they started a tradition of fleshless writing.

Critical psychology relaxed the scene a little bit in the 90's. We engaged concerns for the political and alliances with forms of thought that highlighted the personal like feminism, phenomenology or just approaches expressing concerns about the sociohistorical production of the reality around us. Critical psychology's new theoretical approach made writing in first person possible and even succeeded to standardize a form of reflexivity and make it mainstream to explicit the author's position within the context of the research. Like experimental psychology before them, critical psychology also changed the writing style due to new epistemic and ontological commitments and the need for consistency after changing the apparatus of knowledge production. First person writing became an alternative to third person. Active voice instead of passive. Still no swearing. Fucking disappointing, guys! But, 'extracts' from interviews could contain slang. So some awareness of how people actually use language was there. Critical psychology still contains an alienating effort to sound like a certain kind of person. A western critical subject. Even the reference systems opened a bit with journals and authors that promoted political reflection of our writing and particularly the way we cite only last names and the associated effect of creating the common sense that all authors are males. Critical psychology political commitments' have greatly contributed to further advance and improve some of the very limiting understanding of mainstream psychology, but simultaneously, critical psychology has also made clear what kind of rigidity was intimately linking critical thinking and old mainstream experimental psychology: an anthropocentric discipline obsessed with representation. Unable to overcome the representation hangover, and actually bringing it to an ontological extreme, critical psychology has become the new old school already.

But for both of them, experimental and critical psychology, writing is used as a representational apparatus because knowledge production is based on commitments to empiricism. If experimental psychology was obsessed with objectivity in measurement, critical psychology is obsessed with "making sense" of the world, or what is worse "making sense of the way in which people make sense of the world" creating the eternal spiral of psychology's representational anthropocentrism. Like a dog that chases its own tale, for critical psychology humans keeps trying to make sense of the ways in which humans try to make sense of the ways in which humans try to make sense, and so on. In other words, the writing technologies within psychology are responsible for a good deal of our theoretical limitations.

One very important thing that critical psychology added to the equation was that they realized about the impossibility of measurement (see Michell, 2008), but the obsession with the empirical, and with a production of knowledge that is evidence based is still the same. What I have elsewhere referred to as a reduction of what the world is to what we can access of it (Lara, 2020b). To be clear, if experimental psychology created the illusion that thinking shouldn't be political and called that "objectivity"; to try to fix it, critical psychology created the illusion that everything that matters in the world can be perceptible by us, and we called that lie "evidence based empiricism". As if we could somehow possess everything we know. It is the stubborn gesture that matters of concern for humans should

be reduced to what humans can witness of them, as if the world begins and finishes exactly where our gaze reaches. Representational anthropocentrism. This is what Rachel Liebert (2019) describes as being afraid of not knowing, a feeling that is core for both, whiteness and psychology.

The limitation for this use of language is clear: you can only write about the world to the extent to which the techniques of data collection developed by quantitative or qualitative traditions allow you to access it. Numbers, graphics, descriptions in your words, other people's words, documents, images, even sounds if we get 'experimental', but that is not the whole story, all you get to do with these pieces of the world is to create a taxonomy, to dissect these bits of existence to make them fit into the organized machine of knowledge production. Poor psychology! Permanently fitting data into the representation machine created to legitimate its own existence. Writing. Reading. Talking. All methods of analysis of data, can be reduced to the idea of a methodical categorization that allegedly helps you to understand what these fragments of the world are all about. But psychology -and data analysis in social sciences in general- has forgotten one thing: categorizing fragments of reality and making them fit within the rhetoric of knowledge currently in power doesn't change the way we understand the world. It creates a world. A representation of it. A common sense. And the writing technology that mobilizes such a world. There are a couple of things wrong with this world that knowledge helps to reproduce every single time we teach students to celebrate rationality and detachment in their writing, and when we write like that, and when we talk like that, and when we read like that. Writing. Reading. Talking.

Psychology simultaneously suffers and enjoys an extreme cartoon-like version of the problems of representation. And to be clear, I'm not making up the idea that representation brings significant problems for knowledge and thinking, a French dude wrote a whole book on the topic, long book but it comes to a climax on the conclusion where, -on theorizing difference- he summarizes the argument saying: "It seems that it can become thinkable only when tamed -in other words, when subject to the four iron collars of representation: identity in the concept, opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgment and resemblance in perception" (Deleuze, 1994, 262). Guilty as it is of the problems of representation, mainstream psychology attunes to the celebration of homogeneity, just think about the notion of pathology and all discourses and technologies invested on getting rid of it, or in other words: reduce difference. This french dude theorizing representation didn't mention the colonial potential of representation, but his friend -a poet of colour- did: Édouard Glissant (1997). Representation is always taming the potential of processes by turning them into the specificities of space, explainable, describable, graspable, and most importantly, potentially about the one that observes. The metaphors and analogies that can connect everything in the world to what is already ours. Representing is about colonizing the Writing. Reading. Talking. Again, critical psychology doesn't solve our problems here. If its political commitments help to explore how the sociohistorical context and the relations of power shape human minds, its epistemological and methodological commitments keep these theorizations within the forms of the hegemonic colonial knowledge.

To better understand some of the problems of representation and the corresponding fleshless writing technologies, we could hear Patricia Clough (2000) about the inextricability of the subject and object of knowledge that we can learn from cybernetics. According to her, such insight could reconfigure our understanding of writing, as a framing technology with the potential of creating the illusion of a distinction between the writer and the things they write about. Patricia says: "there is no inherent distinction of observer and observed; there only is a framing of such a distinction and with such a framing, an apparatus of observation of knowing is constituted which is finite but not closed. As such, both reality and agency are inextricable from the constituted apparatus. Although the agency of the subject is involved in constituting the apparatus, the subject's agency also is its effect" (285). If we take seriously Patricia's proposition of writing as a framing apparatus, then we can think about modifying our writing technologies as a solution for epistemological rigidities, ontological hierarchies, and all kind of theoretical limitations begotten by prob-

lems of representation. She sees, as I do, a liberating possibility on breaking apart our old writing habits to deal with “the pressure to rethink the configuration of agency, nature and reality is felt in societies in postmodernity and societies in neocolonialism. For both, experimental writing means rethinking the condition of representation and therefore to engage with figures of subjectivity that do not depend on representation as it has been understood” (Clough, 2000, 286). This is getting decolonial already, but wait til next section.

Representation, Patricia claims, presumes the reproduction of an originary presence, something that is presented again because it is naturally what is expected, therefore means for representation only let us see what we were expecting to find anyway, a (our) measurement, a (our) way of making sense, whatever fits with our fixed idea of what the human is and what it does. Thus, psychology’s writing technologies and the coloniality of english are not two independent problems. Both are devoted to put the gaze of certain men at the center of knowledge production. It would only be when our writing stops being a mere set of technologies to systematize and dissect pieces of reality to be represented that we will overcome the theoretical limitations of the future. Experimental writing is about the future, Patricia said it in the year 2000.

Writing is the framing apparatus that operationalizes the relations between observer and observed. Writing holds the ontological power for the reconfiguration of reality. Academic writing in psychology has been the mean to create a powerful empire of representation. Writing technologies in psychology work as mechanisms to accomplish some kind of Cartesian fantasy of detachment between body and mind. Running away from the flesh; the researcher’s, the participants’ and anyone else’s flesh while looking to understand their minds. To create ‘psychological knowledge’, words turned into swords to behead, to create creatures whose words were apart from their flesh. Or in other writing:

Beheaded Monsters

To make minds up,
lines through throats
bodies drown;
to tell the story
fleshless words,
blind eyes to be seen,
deaf ears to be heard,
other words
to be read.

2 | COLONIAL WRITING

The least, the very least to be done with English is to break it apart. To betray its forms to make it something different than the historical machine of oppression. This is especially important when it comes to the way we use language for knowledge production. Psychological knowledge is by no means the exception, on the contrary, mainstream Psychology is one of the most sophisticated neo-colonial mechanisms that has historically and systematically engaged in promoting the exclusion, delegitimation and pathologization of the indigenous, the blacks, browns, women, disabled, queers, trans, poors, non-christians, the uneducated, the anarchists, the fats and certainly non-English speakers. Given the tremendous amount of literature on this point I won’t cite anyone to ‘support’ this claiming. I know it. You know it. You don’t? That is probably why psychology is so cool to you.

Frantz Fanon explained long ago, in the 50s, I think, the way in which colonial languages create a hierarchical

order where the slaves, the indigenous, the other-tongued would never ever in a million years have the same position than the white Europeans 'blessed' with an European language as their mother tongue. Fanon wrote this in French of course, he had to, he had no choice. A lifetime has passed and not long ago Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o explained again the heart-breaking effect of colonial languages, as he has it, a kid can't dream in their own language, a poet can't write in their own language, and literature is not literature unless it is written in English, Ngũgĩ said this in the 86, I'm saying it on 21, but it doesn't matter, does it? dates, and citations for that matter, are only useful when we use them to track how we have changed, and on this front, we haven't. In Aotearoa, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2017) wrote that the linguistic difference between the colonizer and the colonized operationalizes the researching apparatus through which years of pain and tragedy have been inflicted upon indigenous populations always towards the benefit of the imperial order. Reading. Writing. Talking. Colonizing. In a way that always produces otherness, inferiority, delegitimation.

Regulations in verbal communication have always worked as mechanisms of exclusion that favour colonial hegemonies, where white educated heterosexual abled males naturally speak and write in the way they are supposed to. Shit. No. Wait. It is the other way around. Colonial hegemonies are set around the ways in which white educated heterosexual abled males normally speak and write. Language was imposed in this form. Colonization was. Written. Read. Spoken. Like they do. In English and other colonial languages. Through the creation of a social hierarchy where the whiter you sound, the more European, you become read as eloquent, educated, civilized, one of the 'good ones'. Before imposing the European languages, colonizers had to cut our tongues from the root. Miguel Leon-Portilla (2012) explains how in pre-colonial Tenochtitlan, education relied on orality, singing, conversations and other linguistic technologies apart from writing. It was the colonizer who relied heavily on writing. Certainly, colonization banned our talking and singing rituals, and then, "During Spanish colonization, a lot of nahuatl priests and wisemen were murdered and most of the ancient "amoxtili" (codex) or books were burn to ashes. It was argued that they included idolatry beliefs" (Leon-Portilla, 2012, 16). From Tenochtitlan to the rest of Abya Yala, once local languages were destroyed the language of the colonizers was imposed. Santiago Castro Gómez once wrote an example of the ways in which these forms of language were imposed in the south during colonization. According to them,

González Stephan identifies three disciplinary practices that contributed to shape Latin-American citizens on the 20th century: *constitutions*, *urbanity manuals*, and the *grammars of the language*. Following Uruguayan theorist Angel Rama, Beatriz González claims that such technologies of subjectivity hold something in common: **they gain legitimacy from writing**. Writing was a practice that, on 19th century, responded to the need to order and dispense the logic of "civilization" anticipating modernity dreams for creole elites. Written word constitutes laws and national identities, design modernizing programs, organizes the comprehension of the world in terms of inclusion and exclusion. This is why the foundational project of nations is carried out through the implementation of institutions legitimized by writing (schools, asylums, factories, prisons) and thorough hegemonic discourses (maps, grammatic, constitutions, manuals, hygiene tractates) that rule the conduct of social actors, stabilising frontiers amongst them and transmitting certainty about being inside or outside such limits defined by such written legislation" (Castro-Gómez, 2000, 148-149).

Santiago Castro-Gómez saw it. Writing became the technology that separated the ones that represent from the ones that are represented. Writing. Reading. Talking. But even white folks from fancy schools have seen it too. The intimate relationship between writing habits used to produce knowledge and the colonial agenda of the western world, especially the British empire. Young, for example, claims that "seemingly impartial, objective academic disciplines had in fact colluded with, and indeed been instrumental in, the production of actual forms of colonial

subjugation and administration" (Young, 1995, 159-160). Rather than an exception this is the usual violence of fixed systems of communication: they impose a hierarchy of legitimacy. When we create rules and codes to regulate the socialization and otherwise the use of language, we create a system that simultaneously excludes those who are not familiar with such system and increases the legitimacy of those familiar with the system. Writing formats in academia do exactly this: hoard the Talking. Reading. Writing.

I know, I know, you are reading this and thinking: sure, but how are we going to communicate without a common language? This is exactly my point. As the world is right now, English is certainly the most learnt second language, very useful to nourish connections in the world and everything. The problem of this 'common language' is that it was not created by all peoples to communicate, it was imposed by colonial genocide, this is why it remains untouched, because it's the language of power. This is why it needs to be broken. Shaken away. English can become more useful by losing his power. If language reflects forms of thinking, builds versions of the world, and mobilizes the agenda of those in power, then the main problem with our academic language is that it violently imposes one version of the world upon the others to create what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2010) called epistemic violence. A gesture where the 'representing intellectual' -accomplice of colonization- silences the voice of the subaltern by imposing his understanding of her, when Spivak asks, can the subaltern speak? Or for that matter Speak. Write. Read. Represent themselves or at least escape the representation of the colonizers, the answer continues to be no. Not yet. Her concept of 'epistemic violence' has been brought to psychology by Thomas Teo, who simplifies the effects of colonial silencing and colonial representation claiming that, "if concrete interpretations have negative consequences for groups -even though alternative, equally plausible interpretations of the same data are available -then a form of violence is committed" (Teo, 2010, 296).

Among all the terrible effects of the complicities between psychology and the neocolonial order there is one that is particularly painful, profound and tragic: the use of language as a means to steal pride and instil shame in the colonized subjects that are making efforts to develop the voice of the subaltern. If the effects of the writing technologies in psychology contribute to what Quijano (2019) calls the colonization of knowledge, then the impossibility of becoming a legitimate knowledge producer contributes to the colonization of being. How can we Speak. Write. Read. Be psychologists. If psychology seems to be detached from everything that belongs to us, everything that is us. "Until I can take pride in my language, I cannot take pride in myself", said once a wild, lesbian, chicana (Anzaldúa, 1989, 59) that understood and felt and lived in a world where to be an academic you had to be someone else because you couldn't be you. A world where you can't exist as a subject, let alone as a scholar, a world where "to write, to be a writer, I have to trust and believe in myself as a speaker, as a voice for the images. I have to believe that I can communicate with images and words and that I can do it well. A lack of belief in my creative self is a lack of belief in my total self and vice versa. -I cannot separate my writing from any part of my life. It is all one." (Anzaldúa, 1989, 73). Write. Read. Speak. Or better. Hablar. Leer. Escribir. Or even better. Tlakuiloa. Poua. Tlajtoa.

The colonial writing, the academic writing breaks hearts in multiple ways, because multiple are the forms in which power oppresses through writing: Academic writing is racist because not only excludes non-European languages from relevant platforms like high impact journals (self-legitimated, of course) but its racism is clearer when legitimacy is conferred to scholars of colour only-when/only-if they manage to use language as if they were whites. Academic writing is ableist because it relies on able-body-ness and neurotypicality to be performed and promoted. Academic writing is misogynist because it reproduces uses of language that structurally and systematically invisibilize non-masculine uses of language and repeatedly ignores the existence of women, queers, trans and all non-cis. Academic writing is classist because you can't write like you talk unless you are high class (talking in public) or pretend to be. Please stop this bullshit! Academic writing excludes (non-western) religions and other forms of non-western beliefs because it qualifies their logics and forms of 'opinions' that are not evidence based. It delegitimizes by exoticiz-

ing them. In the previous section I explained the theoretical argument to bet for experimental writing: that academic writing reproduces the theoretical problems of representation. But in this section I wanted to show a more personal one: academic writing breaks people's hearts every day because it's meant to protect the colonial order to exclude subjects and systematically take away the legitimacy of their existence. Our existences and our forms of Writing. Reading. Talking. I know, this is getting emotional, but wait til next section.

I have been victim of the colonial mechanisms described by Castro-Gómez to civilize us through language. I think, like Fanon and Ngūgī, as a colonized kid, forced to think in the codes of the ones that systematically hurt me. Forever infantilized for mispronouncing. I've been forced to colonize my own mind. My tongue. My-self. My Reading. My Writing. My Talking. I have felt along with Tuhiwai Smith the injustice of being spoken about while denied a voice, silenced like Spivak's Indian women with the only apparent destiny of (academic) self-immolation. I'm also the proud owner of a wild tongue -and the consequent wild fingers- and with Anzaldúa, I believe that "the future depends on the breaking down of paradigms" (1989, 80), that "wild tongues can't be tamed, they can only be cut out" (1989, 54). I also developed dreams that took me to speak another language and to be far away from my land. I hear those voices, but I need to offer an alternative for the colonized kids that like me, have been pushed to dream in English, maybe because parents migrated, or because of some lost line of events that took them to be growing up in the metropole while being black kids, brown kids, or disabled kids, or trans, or queer, or women, or Muslim, or poor, or not-english-mother-tongued, or pirate-tongued, fat-tongued, outcast, broken by academic rigidity. I invite you to help me break this imperial language and start a new conversation standing on their ashes. Or in other writing:

Guts and heads,
 bridged by tongues
 colourful, warmth,
 banned, betrayed.
 Yet shown again,
 as others, the others
 beheaded monsters:
 Talking non-sense.
 Burning non-sense.
 Fucking non-sense.

3 | AFFECTIVE WRITING

Academic writing in psychology keeps all the subjects associated to practices of knowledge production captured within certain affective regimes where said subjects are separated from what their bodies can do. What our bodies can do has been restricted by technologies of Writing. Reading. Talking. To develop this argument during this last section I need to offer a bit of a context for the relationship between contemporary affect studies and psychology. A complicated relationship, to say the least. A somehow long history with potentially many faces, but for the sake of this manifesto let's just summarize like this:

When early in the 2000's Affect Studies emerged as a self-claimed new field that would focus attention on the pre-individual, pre-discursive, pre-subject, psychology ignored before engaging, but when it did it did it with the traditional ferocity of the critical spirit developed within psychology from the 80's. After all, critical psychology was the one that finally engaged in conversation with affect to formulate critiques. As the history has been told, Affect Studies took one of the concepts that psychology had been working from years, affect, from Freud's to the writings of

Lacan, Tomkins, Sterns, psychologists of all them, so affect studies wasn't inventing anything new, they were just doing what some psychology had been doing all this time, or that is at least what some psychology would say. The discipline unforgivingly pointed to multiple problems, such as the role of intentionality, free will, sovereignty, the problem of agency (see for example Brown & Stenner, 2010, Cromby & Willis, 2016). The lack of a theorization of subjectivity, the inseparability of affect from emotions, the arbitrary use of multiple terminology (Greco & Stenner, 2008). Its limited understanding of biology (Cromby, 2015). The celebrated separation between affect and meaning/representation (Wetherell, 2012), certainly the lack of an empirical method (Wetherell, 2012), even the critique of the lack of resources to theorize political identities (Lara, et. al., 2017). Although attention to the emotional, or affective, should be a matter of concern for psychology, the idea of decentring psychology by removing human representation -as the object and the means to study the human- wasn't welcome, specially by critical psychology. They strongly refuted the idea of an affect that could potentially be Unread. Unwritten. Unspoken. The very idea that something could precede or be of relevance beyond human representation shakes the foundations of psychology as a discipline even for the most critical voices.

After discussing the problems of representation in the first section we can begin to imagine why it has been so hard for psychology to even consider forms of knowledge that don't reproduce the gestures of representation. In different fields of social sciences and humanities affect theories have gained relevance originating new subfields of study (Lara, 2020a), Psychology nonetheless, depends on representation to exist and to carry on with its colonial agenda. If, unlike critical psychology, we take seriously the proposition of a plane of existence outside the empirical realm, and if we agreed on the impossibility of studying such a realm by the same means developed by our representational academic practices; if we think about affect we can argue two things: 1. That the way in which we write produces experiences where detachment from the body is encouraged. Thus, experiences of Writing. Reading. Talking about psychological matters are made homogeneous (equally boring). And that consequently 2. the researcher and the subject of production of knowledge, the Writer. Reader. Talker in Psychology are constantly brought to inhabit affective environments where the detachment from her body is also violently imposed. Bodies are alienated through writing technologies. This is to say, that Psychology simultaneously produces affective colonial registers and the subject that inhabits/promotes said register: a sort of psychologist-psychologized-psychologizing subject.

Habit is a critical concept to explain the way in which affective registers can be created for bodies to inhabit them. With my friend Antar we have explained how Psychology uses app technologies to train habits into bodies to permanently reproduce sensations in consistency with, and suppress those in opposition to, the regimes of Happiness of the so-called Positive Psychology (Martinez & Lara, 2019). Right after that, I continued to think about habits to explain how colonization allowed spaces for affective experiences that created the conditions of possibility for our relations of gender as they are lived in Abya Yala and that I summarize by claiming that due to remaining captured by colonial affective registers: Men hate women (Lara, 2021). To avoid the unnecessary jargon much loved by both, psychology and affect studies, let's put it simply as I can: repeating the same again and again gets you used to feeling the same again and again. This creates a familiar place, a familiar sensation will feel safe, a place that you will recognize as who you are. A place to be defended with colonial rage.

In the opening section I mentioned some of the characteristic gestures of academic writing in psychology, third person, passive voice, no swearing, no slang, no colloquialisms, "alleged" no judgment, no opinions, evidence based, linguistic clarity, and other forms of worshipping representational rationality. For the writer, following a logic of use of language like this one, necessarily means to disconnect her thinking, and the corresponding Writing. Reading. Talking away from lived, incarnated experiences in which reality and the self have connected. But this ain't a matter of concern for Psychology anyway. To make yourself impassioned about your object of study, or to write as if you were, all you have felt about the world needs to be translated into a perfectly accountable form of representation so it

can become psychology. Thus, the efforts made to produce psychological knowledge within academia are directed to repeat again and again gestures of distance toward our own bodies. Talk in third person, like imagining that the subject of your narrative is not and can't be you. Write in passive voice, like if the subject that produces the representations offered in your narrative was standing on a different plane of enunciation than the rest of the subjects. No swearing, simultaneously anti-low class an anti-passion, both of them delegitimizing real forms of use of language. No opinions, judgment, evidence based, clarity, etc; to continue the psychological knowledge as an enterprise committed with a limited understanding of the empirical and the knowledge to be produced from there. This is the spiral of repetition of detachment gestures, it is the colonial affective register to which psychologists (and many others in the industry of knowledge) have to attune to as they develop careers.

But the colonial affective register has a second consequence apart from aligning the body of the one trying to write psychology, it also produces a representation -and in consequence the discourse that aligns the bodies of- those who are represented. The subjects of psychological discourses. When we represent subjects as an identifiable set of coordinates subjected to relatively stable, knowable, units of existence like personality traits we, psychology, turn a problem of representation into a whole area of study: The problem of turning a process -such a living human- into special categories -such as personality traits-. Making the study of individual difference / personality psychology the epitome of the evil intertwines that consolidate psychology as a power-knowledge device at the service of colonization. THE study of THE subject. Every time psychology, as a legitimate voice of expertise, is used to solve a problem, technologies of capture of potential are very likely to be set in place. The application of a theory meant to represent, can't be other than the production of a technology that attempts to capture what has already been represented. From intelligence tests to interviews for qualitative research. Extractive technologies interested only in the exploitation and translation of fragments of existence. This is done using a writing technology that reduces the landscape of affective experiences of these subjects representing for and being represented by psychology. Taming their bodies' potential. Psychology and its academic writing separate bodies of what they can do. Sad. Promotes the affective rigidity of white rationality (Liebert, this issue). Damn sad! Always endarkened by the backdrop of resentment. Always presented as the divine order to be protected. The legitimate voice of psychology.

Writing technologies reproduce habits. Forms of doing. Forms of doing contract forms of being. Forms of Writing. Reading. Talking. Writing technologies work as devices that permanently push the subject into certain affective registers. To exist again and again into the same affective and therefore corporeal repertoire. And to create forms of thinking about others that eventually elicit forms to treat these others. Psychology is then a complex entanglement of colonial and neo-colonial technologies that simultaneously creates the subject that keeps it alive, and the subject of study whose theorization keeps psychology alive. Through colonial affective registers mobilized -among other things- by writing technologies, psychology produces the psychologist-psychologized-psychologizing subject.

Calling for an engagement with writing that doesn't reproduce the problems of representation is an invitation to experiment with writing. Experimental writing is crucial for the material dimension of writing and to rethink the ethics of what our writing is doing to our bodies and to the bodies of those who we write about. Attempting to develop writing that doesn't feel the same way every time is a revolutionary act. Attempting to feel -through writing- rather than merely understand other subjects would be its consequence. Experimental writing has the potential to become a technology that alters the affective registers within which bodies engage with practices of Writing. Reading. Talking about Psychology and other matters. Or in other writing:

Scaring like hell,
petrifying movers
from petrifying places:
Soul suckers, they
can't feel, can't dance.
They write.
They read.
They talk.
Let's poem them away.

4 | LASTLY

I've said a lot. I know. But I just wanted to say three things. The three main reasons that push me to suggest that experimental writing holds the potential to address a range of problems of Psychology through different registers, theoretical, ethical, problems, philosophical, political, ontological and epistemological problems. To make this claim, I have stated: Firstly, that a system of language exclusions operates within colonization, adopts the form of a representational apparatus, produces epistemic violence, and is mobilized by forms of Writing. Reading. Talking. Creating fleshless words as a writing technology for academic psychology. Second, that simultaneously this system of power-knowledge-representation has contributed to the ontological split between the representing and the represented subject, also known as colonization. In this sense academia and academics have been accomplices of colonial practices of exclusion and delegitimation made in the name of knowledge. Third, that the practices that reproduce the Writing. Reading. Talking technologies require an habitual repetition that maintains both, the subject and the object of knowledge in psychology attuned to specific affective registers characterized by promoting detachment from their bodies. Or in other writing:

Beheaded Monsters

To make minds up,
lines through throats
bodies drown;
to tell the story
fleshless words:
Blind eyes to be seen,
deaf ears to be heard,
other words
to be read.

Guts and heads,
bridged by tongues
colourful, warmth, banned,
betrayed tongues.
Yet shown again,
as others, the others:
beheaded monsters.
Being non-sense.
Burning non-sense.
Fucking non-sense.

Scaring like hell,
petrifying movers
from petrifying places.
Soul suckers, they
can't feel, can't dance.
They write.
They read.
They talk.
Let's poem them away.

5 | CONCRETE

This text says things. But that the act of saying should occur differently is the main idea of this manifesto. Thus, a performative exercise crosses through the whole piece: by means of playing with the voices of enunciation, inconsistency in citation forms, swearing, jokes, sarcasm, bending syntactic rules, and other unlikely uses of language to be found in an academic paper I intended to give a certain tone to the piece, to pursue a feeling rather than only the understanding of my argument. I tried to fill the writing with my flesh, to sound like I do. Beheaded Monsters is the effort to write a feeling. Turning three arguments into the three pieces of my tryptic poem. To evoke the prosthetic character of poetry to get the reader to feel the scary effects, connections, and history of academic writing. Concretely speaking, this writing was all about eliciting feelings.

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